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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY L. NICKLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
12850

vs.

DOMINIC GUARASCIO,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals the finding of the Third District Court, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, presiding, that Defendant owes a duty of support to Plaintiff enforceable under the Unified Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act §§ 77-6la-1 to 39, Utah Code Annotated (1963).
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant was adjudged to be the parent of one
Lisa Nickle and ordered to provide support payments in
her behalf by the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge presiding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was tried under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
Judge presiding, to determine whether a duty of support was owed to one Lisa Nickle. The original petition
filed in Mesa County, Colorado, revealed that Lisa
Nickle was born April 14, 1967, and that the defendant
was not the husband of the mother of Lisa Nickle at any
time prior or subsequent to said birth. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint in the Third Judicial
District Court and the Order to Show Cause served thereunder on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
first because the statute of limitations for determining
paternity in Colorado as a civil matter expired on April
5, 1968, and secondly because the entertaining of the
issue of paternity under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was tantamount to the application of a Colorado criminal statute in a Utah state
Court. It is this denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss
that defendant claims was error, and from which he
appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The matter should be remanded to the District
Court with instructions to grant defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
CA USE:
A. THE QUESTION OF PATERNITY
WAS BARRED AT THE DATE OF TRIAL BY
THE COLORADO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
B. THE SUBJECTING OF DEFENDANT
TO A TRIAL ON THE PATERNITY QUESTION IN UTAH AMOUNTS TO AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF COLORADO CRIMINAL LAW WITHIN THIS STATE.
A. Plaintiff in the instant proceeding alleged that
the defendant was the father of the child born in April of
1967 and invoked §§ 77-6la-l to 39 Utah Code Annotated ( 1963) , the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act to
secure child support payments for said child. The colorado equivalent to that act is found in §§ 43-2-1 to 33
Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963). An examination of both the
Colorado and Utah acts reveals that neither of those acts

3

give rise to an action to determine paternity. By her
bringing this action and invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court under the fore going acts, the defendant raises not
so much the question of support as the question of paternity. Thus, the proceeding in the District Court from
which your appellant appeals was a proceeding to determine paternity. In the absence of a specific authority in
the Uniform Reciprocal Acts to determine the question
of paternity, the law of the state in which the conception
and/or birth occurred is the applicable law to determine
paternity as a civil matter.
In Colorado, paternity may be determined in a bastardy proceeding pursuant to §§ 22-6-1 to 6 Colo. Rev.
Stat. ( 1963). A proceeding under these subsections has
been determined to be a civil action. Yeager vs. People,
ll6 Colo. 379, 181P.2d442 (1947). Section 22-6-6 Colo.
Rev. Stat. (1963) imposes a limitation on this civil pro·
ceeding and states: "No proceeding under this article
shall be instituted after the child is 12 months old." Thus,
the civil question of paternity could have been tried in
the State of Colorado or possibly in the State of Utah
through the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act within
twelve months after the birth of the child.
An examination of the Utah and Colorado Uniform
Reciprocal Support acts again reveals no provision pur·
porting to expand or change the Statute of Limitations
of a paternity proceeding.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Acts in both states do not give rise to or create new duties
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of support. On the contrary, these acts merely provide
for the enforcement between sister states having adopted
this act of the duties "imposed or imposable" under already existing law. See § 43-2-2, 7 Colo. Rev. Stat.
(1963); § 77-6la-2, 7 Utah Code Ann. (1963). The
wording in the last quoted sections means that state law
must give rise to an action and grant the appropriate
court jurisdiction thereof before the same could be enforced in an interstate action pursuant to the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts.
It is clear that more than twelve months had expired since the birth of Lisa Nickle whom the plaintiff
claims defendant fathered. Plaintiff's right to try the
paternity issue there involved expired at the expiration
of twelve months after April 4, 1967, under § 22-6-6
Colo. Rev. Stat. ( 1963). Therefore, the Utah court had
no jurisdiction to entertain a paternity proceeding in
this state when such was clearly barred as a civil matter
under the laws of the state wherein the cause of action
arises.

For jurisdictional purposes, two points of law are
undisputed requiring no citation. First, jurisdiction is
vested in the Court in the county or district wherein the
cause of action arose and second, should any other court
obtain personal jurisdiction of the defendant, that court
would apply the law of the state wherein the cause of
action arose. Thus, the Utah court is bound to observe
Colorado law in this instance. If the action would not be
cognizable in Colorado, a Utah court has no jurisdiction
notwithstanding the attempt to confer jurisdiction was
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made through the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act.
The time for bringing a paternity action as a civil matter
in Colorado had expired. And having expired, there
exists no basis in either the common law or statutes, in
which the Utah court could assert jurisdiction for the
purposes of determining that question. Thus, the Court's
failure to dismiss on counsel's motion was reversible,
prejudicial error and the same should be reversed on that
ground.
B. In addition to determining the paternity as a
civil matter as heretofore argued, the Colorado cases provide that paternity may be adjudicated as a criminal
matter under the Desertion and Nonsupport Statutes.
Wamsley vs. People, 64 Colo. 521, 173 Pac. 425 (1918).
In the Wamsley case, the court acknowledges that civil
proceedings for paternity are limited by § 22-6-6 Colo.
Rev. Stat. (1963), but decide that paternity may be determined pursuantto § 43-1-1 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963) as
a criminal matter. Thus, although the paternity question
which the Utah court allowed to be determined could not
have been decided in Colorado as a civil matter, that
question could have been decided in Colorado pursuant
to a criminal proceeding. However, in entertaining the
paternity proceeding pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Utah Court in
effect gave improper and unlawful application to Colorado penal law. Under well established principles of the
common law and the statutes and criminal law of both
Utah and Colorado, the situs of a crime is that where the
crime is committed and it is that situs which confers
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jurisdiction.§ 77-8-1 Utah Code Ann. (1963), Art. II
Sec. 16, Colo. Const.
§ 43-1-1 Colo. Rev. Stat. ( 1963) makes the wilfull
failure of any man to support his children a felony.
Thus, pursuant to that statute and the case law, the paternity of Lisa Nickle could be tried. But jurisdiction in
criminal matters "rests solely in the courts of the state or
country in which the crime is committed." 21 AmJ ur 2d
§ 383. It is further stated in 21 AmJ ur 2d § 384 that
"The court of one state or country will not execute the
penal or criminal laws of another state or country, where
such laws are deemed to be strictly local and distinguishable from obligations under foreign statutes of a purely
contractual, rather than penal, nature."
As has been stated previously, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts operate merely as
conduits through which duties of support existent in one
state may be applied in the state where an obligor is
found. The duties of support must be created by a statute other than those encompassed by the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts. In this case, a
duty of support is in fact created by § 43-1-1 Colo. Rev.
Stat. ( 1963) and pursuant to Wamsley, paternity may
be tried thereunder. But this treats the question as a
criminal action. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Acts under which the instant action was
brought could not and do not operate in such a way as to
allow the bringing of an action based on criminal statutes
in any state other than that in which the violation is committed. Therefore, the taking of jurisdiction by the Utah
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court in this proceeding for the determination of a paternity pursuant to the criminal statutes of Colorado is
error. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts of both Utah and Colorado recognize that duty
of support and question.s such as paternity arising under
criminal statutes are not cognizable under either act.
This is evident from an examination of Colorado statutes
§§ 43-2-5, 6 Colo. Rev. Stat. ( 1963) and the Utah statutes §§ 77-6la-5, 6 Utah Code Ann. ( 1963) which provide for the interstate rendition of persons charged with
crime. Section 43-2-5 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1963) provides:
The Governor of this State may demand the Governor of any other state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is charged in
this state with a crime of failing to provide support of any person in this state and may surrender
on demand by the Governor of any other state
any person found in this state who is charged in
such other state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in such other
state. The provisions for extradition of criminals
not inconsistent herewith shall apply to any such
demand, although the person whose surrender is
demanded was not in the demanding state at the
time of the commission of the crime and although
he had not fled therefrom. Neither the
the oath, nor any proceedings for extradition,
pursuant to this section need state or show that
the person whose surrender is demanded has fled
from justice, or at the time ?f the commission of
the crime was in the demandmg or other state.
Clearly, from the section quoted above, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts recognize that
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the crime of a "Wilfull Failure to Provide" may not be
prosecuted in any other State and therefore make extradition considerably easier by this method. It is undisputed that the defendant would be subject to a criminal
prosecution for failure to provide for Lisa Nickle in the
State of Colorado and that pursuant to that prosecution,
his paternity of said child could legitimately be determined. Such is in fact the remedy which should have
been applied to determine the paternity. Had this been
done, then the State of Colorado could avail itself of the
less complicated extradition which is provided for under
§§ 77-6la-5,6, Utah Code Ann. (1963). These sections
dealing with interstate rendition in both the Colorado
and Utah acts are clear evidence that the various legislators understood the jurisdictional prohibitions to trying
a crime in a State other than that in which it was commited. If the crime itself cannot be tried in another State,
a fortiori, the element of that crime could not be litigated
in a civil action in another State. Paternity is the very
foundation of a "Wilfull Failure to Provide" criminal
action. That paternity must be determined, if such is
treated as a criminal matter, in the State in which the
criminal action took place.
The Utah court in the instant case in fact took cognizance of a paternity question and decided the same.
That paternity question could only he presented under a
criminal sanction in the State of Colorado. In entertaining the criminal statute borne question of paternity in
this State, the Utah court committed prejudicial and
reversible error.

9

CONCLUSION
Because of the expiration of the time under Colorado statutes within which paternity could be litigated as
a civil question, the Utah court, the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act notwithstanding, had no
jurisdiction to proceed on that question. In proceeding,
the Utah court committed reversible error. Further, although paternity could be litigated in Colorado as a
criminal issue, the same could not be litigated in Utah
under the civil provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act since that issue can be determined only at the situs of the crime.
Therefore on these two grounds, the determination
by the District Court that the defendant herein is the
parent of one Lisa Nickle, is improper, because the Utah
court had no jurisdiction to try that question. For these
reasons, defendant urges that the findings of the lower
court be reversed, that the matter be remanded to the
District Court with instructions to grant plaintiff's Mo·
tion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
321 South 6th East

Salt Lake City, Utah
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